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Abstract
Meyer originally raised the question of whether non-contextual hidden
variable models can, despite the Kochen-Specker theorem, simulate the
predictions of quantum mechanics to within any fixed finite experimental
precision (Meyer, D. 1999. Phys. Rev. Lett., 83, 3751-3754). Meyer’s
result was extended by Kent (Kent, A. 1999. Phys. Rev. Lett., 83, 3755-
3757). Clifton and Kent later presented constructions of non-contextual
hidden variable theories which, they argued, indeed simulate quantum
mechanics in this way (Clifton, R and Kent, A. 2000. Proc. Roy. Soc.
Lond. A, 456, 2101-2114).
These arguments have evoked some controversy. Among other things,
it has been suggested that the Clifton-Kent models do not in fact repro-
duce correctly the predictions of quantum mechanics, even when finite
precision is taken into account. It has also been suggested that care-
ful analysis of the notion of contextuality in the context of finite preci-
sion measurement motivates definitions which imply that the Clifton-Kent
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models are in fact contextual. Several critics have also argued that the
issue can be definitively resolved by experimental tests of the Kochen-
Specker theorem or experimental demonstrations of the contextuality of
Nature.
One aim of this paper is to respond to and rebut criticisms of the
Meyer-Clifton-Kent papers. We thus elaborate in a little more detail
how the Clifton-Kent models can reproduce the predictions of quantum
mechanics to arbitrary precision. We analyse in more detail the relation-
ship between classicality, finite precision measurement and contextuality,
and defend the claims that the Clifton-Kent models are both essentially
classical and non-contextual. We also examine in more detail the senses
in which a theory can be said to be contextual or non-contextual, and in
which an experiment can be said to provide evidence on the point. In par-
ticular, we criticise the suggestion that a decisive experimental verification
of contextuality is possible, arguing that the idea rests on a conceptual
confusion.
Keywords: Kochen-Specker, contextual, finite precision, experiment,
loophole
1 Introduction
1.1 The Kochen-Specker theorem
Consider a set K of Hermitian operators that act on an n-dimensional Hilbert
space. Suppose that V is a map that takes a Hermitian operator in K to a real
number in its spectrum. We call such a map a colouring of K. If the following
conditions are satisfied
V (Aˆ+ Bˆ) = V (Aˆ) + V (Bˆ)
V (AˆBˆ) = V (Aˆ)V (Bˆ)
∀Aˆ, Bˆ ∈ K such that [Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0, (1)
then the map is a KS-colouring of K. We call these conditions the KS criteria.
Kochen and Specker’s celebrated theorem (Specker, 1960; Kochen & Specker,
1967) states that if n > 2 there are KS-uncolourable sets, i.e., sets K for which
no KS-colouring exists. It follows trivially that the set of all Hermitian operators
acting on a Hilbert space of dimension > 2 is KS-uncolourable.
The fact that the set of all Hermitian operators in dimension > 2 is KS-
uncolourable is a corollary of Gleason’s theorem (Gleason, 1957). This was first
pointed out in Bell (1966), where an independent proof was also given. Kochen
and Specker constructed the first finite KS-uncolourable set. Many proofs along
the lines of Kochen and Specker’s have since been produced by constructing
demonstrably KS-uncolourable sets (see, e.g., Peres, 1995; Zimba & Penrose,
1993; Conway & Kochen; Cabello et al., 1996). The most common type of proof
describes a set of 1-dimensional projection operators in n dimensions that is KS-
uncolourable. If we represent 1-dimensional projections by vectors onto which
2
they project, and colour the corresponding set of vectors with a 1 or a 0, the
KS criteria would imply that for each orthogonal n-tuple of vectors, exactly one
must be coloured 1, and all the rest 0. The Kochen-Specker theorem can then
be proved by showing that the colouring condition cannot be satisfied. In their
original proof, Kochen and Specker describe a set of 117 vectors in 3 dimensions
that is KS-uncolourable.1
Of course, the well-known proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem referred to
above are logically correct. Moreover, the Kochen-Specker theorem undeniably
says something very important and interesting about fundamental physics: it
shows that the predictions of quantum theory for the outcomes of measurements
of Hermitian operators belonging to a KS-uncolourable set cannot be precisely
reproduced by any hidden variable theory that assigns real values to these op-
erators in a way that respects the KS criteria, since no such hidden variable
theory exists. However, debate continues over the extent to which Kochen and
Specker succeeded in their stated aim, “to give a proof of the nonexistence of
hidden variables”(Kochen & Specker, 1967, p.59), even when this is qualified (as
it must be) by restricting attention to non-contextual hidden variables. Before
summarising and continuing this debate, we review why one might be interested
in hidden variable theories in the first place.
Consider a system in a state |ψ〉 and a set of observables A,B,C, . . . such
that |ψ〉 is not an eigenstate of Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, . . .; here we use capital letters with
hats to denote Hermitian operators and capital letters without hats to denote
the corresponding observables. Orthodox quantum mechanics leads us to say
something like this: if we measure A, we will obtain the result a with probability
pa, if we measure B, we will obtain the result b with probability pb, and so on.
With an ease born of familiarity, the well trained quantum mechanic will not
bat an eyelid at such statements. But, one might well ask: why are they so
oddly phrased? Could this just be a rather awkward way of saying that with
probability pa, the value of A is a, or with probability pb, the value of B is b,
and so on?
Suppose that the set A,B,C, . . . corresponds to a KS-uncolourable set of
operators Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, . . .. The suggestion is that at a given time, each observable
in the set has some definite value associated with it, defined by some “hidden”
variables of the system. The significance of the KS criteria is that if the Her-
mitian operators associated with two observables commute, then according to
quantum mechanics, the observables can be simultaneously measured, and the
values obtained will satisfy the KS criteria (and in general will satisfy any func-
tional relationships that hold between the operators themselves). We are not
logically compelled to assume that any hidden variable theory shares these prop-
erties. However, the standard motivation for considering hidden variables is to
examine the possibility that quantum theory, while not incorrect, is incomplete,
Thus motivated, it seems natural to assume that the colouring defined by the
hidden variables must also satisfy the KS criteria. But given this assumption,
1How small can a KS-uncolourable set of vectors be? The current records stand at 31
vectors in 3 dimensions (Conway & Kochen) and 18 in 4 dimensions (Cabello et al., 1996).
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since there is no such colouring, the original supposition that the observables
have definite values must be wrong.
The contradiction obtained in the Kochen-Specker theorem is avoided if, in-
stead of defining a map V , we assign values to Hermitian operators in such a way
that the value assigned to a particular Hermitian operator depends on which
commuting set we are considering that operator to be part of. Such a value
assignment is called contextual. Hidden variable interpretations of quantum
theory based on contextual value assignments can be defined. In such contex-
tual hidden variable (CHV) interpretations, the outcome obtained on measuring
a certain quantum mechanical observable is indeed pre-defined, but depends in
general on which other quantum mechanical observables are measured at the
same time. Thus, if we take the KS criteria for granted, Kochen and Specker’s
results show that there are no non-contextual hidden variable (NCHV) interpre-
tations of the standard quantum mechanical formalism.
It may seem tempting to phrase this more directly, concluding that the
Kochen- Specker theorem shows that Nature cannot be described by any non-
contextual hidden variable theory. Another possible conclusion is that the KS
theorem implies that we could exclude non-contextual hidden variable theories
if the predictions of quantum theory were confirmed in a suitably designed
experiment. We will argue below that neither conclusion is correct.
1.2 Querying the scope of the KS theorem
We next review some earlier discussions that suggest limitations on what can
be inferred from the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Some time ago, Pitowsky devised models (Pitowsky, 1983, 1985) that as-
sign values non-contextually to the orthogonal projections in three dimensions
and nonetheless satisfy (1) “almost everywhere” (Pitowsky, 1983, p.2317). The
models are non-constructive, requiring the axiom of choice and the continuum
hypothesis (or some suitable weaker assumption) for their definition. Another
complication is that the term “almost everywhere” is not meant in the standard
sense, but with respect to a non-standard version of measure theory proposed
by Pitowsky (see Pitowsky, 1983) which, among other disconcerting features,
allows the intersection of two sets of probability measure 1 to have probability
measure 0 (Pitowsky, 1982a).
Pitowsky’s models disagree with quantum mechanics for some measurement
choices, as the KS theorem shows they must. They thus do not per se seem
to pose an insuperable obstacle to arguments that — either directly from the
theorem or with the aid of suitable experiments — purport to demonstrate the
contextuality of Nature.2 After all, either the demonstration of a finite non-
colourable set of projectors is sufficient to run an argument, or it is not. If it is,
Pitowsky’s models are irrelevant to the point; if it is not, it is not obvious that
the models, equipped as they are with an entirely novel version of probability
theory, are either necessary or sufficient for a refutation.
2Nor, it should be stressed, did Pitowsky suggest that they do.
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A more direct challenge to the possibility of theoretical or experimental
refutations of non-contextual hidden variables was presented in Meyer (1999),
where the implications of finite experimental precision are emphasised: “Only
finite precision measurements are experimentally reasonable, and they cannot
distinguish a dense subset from its closure” (Meyer, 1999, p.3751). Meyer iden-
tified a particularly simple and elegant construction, originally described in
Godsil & Zaks (1988), of a KS-colourable dense subset of the set of projectors
in three dimensions.3 His conclusion was that, at least in three dimensions, the
Kochen-Specker theorem could be “nullified”.4 As a corollary, Meyer argued
that the KS theorem alone cannot discriminate between quantum and classical
(therefore non-contextual) information processing systems.
Meyer left open the question of whether static non-contextual hidden vari-
able theories reproducing the predictions of quantum theory for three dimen-
sional systems actually exist: his point was that, contrary to most previous
expectations, the Kochen-Specker theorem does not preclude such hidden vari-
able theories.
Meyer’s result was subsequently extended by a construction of KS-colourable
dense sets of projectors in complex Hilbert spaces of arbitrary dimension (Kent,
1999). Clifton and Kent (CK) extended the result further by demonstrating
the existence of dense sets of projection operators, in complex Hilbert spaces of
arbitrary dimension, with the property that no two compatible projectors are
members of incompatible resolutions of the identity (Clifton & Kent, 2000). The
significance of this property is that it makes it trivial to construct a distribution
over different hidden states that recovers the quantum mechanical expectation
values. Such a distribution is, of course, necessary for a static hidden variable
theory to reproduce the predictions of quantum theory. Similar constructions
of dense subsets of the sets of all positive operators were also demonstrated
(Kent, 1999; Clifton & Kent, 2000). CK presented their constructions as non-
contextual hidden variable theories that can indeed simulate the predictions
of quantum mechanics in the sense that the theories are indistinguishable in
real experiments in which the measurement operators are defined with finite
precision.
The arguments set out by Meyer, Kent, and Clifton and Kent (MKC) have
evoked some controversy (see, e.g., Mermin, 1999; Cabello, 1999; Basu et al.,
2001; Simon et al., 2001; Larsson, 2002; Peres, 2003; Appleby, 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003; Havlicek et al., 2001; Cabello, 2002; Breuer, 2002) and even a parodyPeres
(2003). Among other things, it has been suggested (Cabello, 2002) that the CK
models do not in fact reproduce correctly the predictions of quantum mechanics,
even when finite precision is taken into account. It has also been suggested
(Simon et al., 2001; Larsson, 2002; Appleby, 2000) that careful analysis of the
3As Pitowsky has since noted, Meyer’s argument could also be framed using one of
Pitowsky’s constructions of dense KS-colourable sets of projectors rather than Godsil and
Zaks’.
4It should perhaps be emphasised that the sense of “nullify” intended here is “counteract
the force or effectiveness of”, not “invalidate”. Neither Meyer nor anyone else has suggested
that the proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem are flawed.
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notion of contextuality in the context of finite precision measurement motivates
definitions which imply that the CK models are in fact contextual.
Several of these critiques raise novel and interesting points, which have ad-
vanced our understanding of the Kochen-Specker theorem and its implications.
Nonetheless, we remain convinced that the essential insight of Meyer (1999) and
all the substantial points made in Kent (1999) and Clifton & Kent (2000) are
valid. One aim of this paper is thus to respond to and rebut MKC’s critics.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, quite a few critics have made similar points. Also,
some purportedly critical arguments make points irrelevant to the arguments
of the MKC papers (which were carefully limited in their scope). Rather than
producing a comprehensive — but, we fear, unreadable — collection of counter-
critiques of each critical article, we have tried in this paper to summarise and
comment on the most interesting new lines of argument.
Among other things, we explain here in a little more detail how the CK mod-
els can reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics to arbitrary precision,
both for single measurements and for sequences. We point out a conceptual
confusion among critics who suggest that the models are contextual, noting
that the arguments used would (incorrectly) suggest that Newtonian physics
and other classical theories are contextual. We also defend the claim that the
CK models are essentially classical. Indeed, as we explain, the models show
in principle that one can construct classical devices that assign measurement
outcomes non-contextually and yet simulate quantum mechanics to any given
fixed non-zero precision. In summary, we reiterate the original claim of MKC
that the models, via finite precision, provide a loophole — which is physically
implausible but logically possible — in the Kochen-Specker argument.
Running through these debates is another theme: the alleged possibility
of experimental tests of the Kochen-Specker theorem, or experimental demon-
strations of the contextuality of Nature. Quite a few experiments purporting
to test contextuality have recently been proposed (Cabello & Garc´ia-Alcaine,
1998; Simon et al., 2000; Basu et al., 2001) and performed (Huang et al., 2003;
Hasegawa et al., 2003). Several authors have suggested an analogy between
these purported experimental tests of contextuality and Bell experiments test-
ing local causality.
Another aim of this paper is to go beyond previous discussions in examining
in detail the senses in which a theory can be said to be contextual or non-
contextual, and in which an experiment can be said to provide evidence for these.
Broadly, we are critical of the idea of an experimental test of non-contextuality,
arguing that the idea rests on conceptual confusion. The experiments that have
been performed test predictions of quantum mechanics which certainly conflict
with some classical intuitions, and which might indeed raise questions about the
contextuality of measurements to someone familiar only with certain aspects of
quantum theory. But, as we re-emphasize in this paper, they certainly do not
provide loophole-free demonstrations of the contextuality of Nature, since the
CK models can reproduce the experimental data.
There is also a more basic problem. Interpreting the experiments in a way
which raises the question of contextuality at all requires assuming significant
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parts of the formalism of quantum theory. On the other hand, if we simply as-
sume quantum theory is valid, without any qualification, we need no experiment:
the Kochen-Specker theorem already excludes non-contextual hidden variable
theories. It is thus quite hard to pin down what exactly a purported experimen-
tal test of contextuality proves, or could prove, that we do not know already. In
our opinion, this key point is not adequately addressed in the papers under dis-
cussion (Cabello & Garc´ia-Alcaine, 1998; Simon et al., 2000; Basu et al., 2001;
Huang et al., 2003; Hasegawa et al., 2003).
2 MKC models
Kochen and Specker’s declared motivation for constructing finite uncolourable
sets is interesting, both because it partly anticipates the point made a third of
a century later by Meyer and because its implications seem to have been largely
ignored in the period intervening:
It seems to us important in the demonstration of the non-existence of
hidden variables that we deal with a small finite partial Boolean al-
gebra. For otherwise a reasonable objection can be raised that in fact
it is not physically meaningful to assume that there are a continuum
number of quantum mechanical propositions. (Kochen & Specker,
1967, p.70)
What Kochen and Specker neglected to consider is that the objection might
be sharpened: it could be that in fact only a specified countable set of quan-
tum mechanical propositions exist, and it could be that this set has no KS-
uncolourable subsets (finite or otherwise). This is the possibility that the MKC
models exploit.
Before discussing these models, we wish to reemphasise the disclaimers made
in Clifton & Kent (2000). MKCmodels describe a type of hidden variable theory
that is a logically possible alternative to standard quantum theory, but not, in
our view, a very plausible one. The CK constructions in particular, are ugly and
contrived models, produced merely to make a logical point. One might hope to
devise prettier hidden variable models which do the same job, using a colouring
scheme as natural and elegant as Godsil and Zaks’. Even if such models were
devised, though, we would not be inclined to take them too seriously as scientific
theories.
However, we think it important to distinguish between scientific implausibil-
ity and logical impossibility. The models show that only the former prevents us
from adopting a non-contextual interpretation of any real physical experiment.
Another reason for studying the models — in fact, Meyer’s main original moti-
vation (Meyer, 1999) — is to glean insights into the possible roˆle of contextuality
in quantum information theory.
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2.1 Projective measurements
The argument of Kochen & Specker (1967), and most later discussions until
recently, including Meyer (1999), assume that the quantum theory of measure-
ment can be framed entirely in terms of projective measurements. This remains
a tenable view, so long as one is willing to accept that the experimental con-
figuration defines the quantum system being measured.5 We adopt it here,
postponing discussion of positive operator valued (POV) measurements to the
next subsection.
Meyer identified a KS-colouring, originally described in Godsil & Zaks (1988),
of the set S2∩Q3 of unit vectors in R3 with rational components, or equivalently
of the projectors onto these vectors. As he pointed out, not only is this set of
projectors dense in the set of all projectors in R3, but the corresponding set of
projective decompositions of the identity is dense in the space of all projective
decompositions of the identity.
Meyer’s result is enough to show that an NCHV theory along these lines is
not ruled out by the Kochen-Specker theorem. It does not show that such a
theory exists. For this we need there to be KS-colourable dense sets of projectors
in complex Hilbert spaces of arbitrary dimension. Further, it is not enough for
each set to admit at least one KS-colouring. For each quantum state, one
must be able to define a distribution over different KS-colourings such that
the correct quantum expectation values are obtained. For these reasons, Kent
extended Meyer’s result by constructing KS-colourable dense sets of projectors
in complex Hilbert spaces of arbitrary dimension (Kent, 1999). Clifton and
Kent extended the result further (Clifton & Kent, 2000) by demonstrating the
existence of dense sets of projection operators, in complex Hilbert spaces of
arbitrary dimension, with the property that no two compatible projectors are
members of incompatible resolutions of the identity. The significance of this
property is that it makes it trivial to construct a distribution over different
hidden states that recovers the quantum mechanical expectation values.
CK argue that this construction allows us to define a non-contextual hidden
variable theory that simulates quantum mechanics, by the following reasoning.
First, let us suppose that, as in the standard von Neumann formulation of quan-
tum mechanics, every measurement corresponds to a projective decomposition of
the identity. However, because any experimental specification of a measurement
has finite precision, we need not suppose that every projective decomposition
corresponds to a possible measurement. Having defined a dense set of projectors
P that gives rise to a dense set of projective decompositions of the identity D, we
may stipulate that every possible measurement corresponds to a decomposition
of the identity in D. The result of any measurement is determined by hidden
variables that assign a definite value to each operator in P in a non-contextual
manner. Via the spectral decomposition theorem, those Hermitian operators
whose eigenvectors correspond to projectors in P are also assigned values. If
5For instance, a projective measurement on a quantum system S together with an ancillary
quantum system A requires us, on this view, to take S + A as the system being measured,
rather than speaking of a positive operator valued measurement being carried out on S.
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measurements could be specified with infinite precision, then it would be easy
to distinguish this alternative theory from standard quantum mechanics. We
could simply ensure that our measurements correspond exactly to the projectors
featured in some KS-uncolourable set. If they in fact corresponded to slightly
different projectors, we would detect the difference.
Now, for any finite precision, and any KS-uncolourable set of projectors,
there will be projectors from P sufficiently close that the supposition that our
measurements correspond to those from P will not make a detectable difference.
So, which particular element of D does this measurement correspond to? CK
propose that the answer to this question is determined algorithmically by the
hidden variable theory.
Let us illustrate how this could work by fleshing out, with more detail than
was given in Clifton & Kent (2000), one way in which a CK model could work.
Consider some ordering {d1, d2, . . .} of the countable set D. Let ǫ be a parameter
much smaller than the precision attainable in any current or foreseeable experi-
ment. More precisely, ǫ is sufficiently small that it will be impossible to tell from
the outcome statistics if a measurement attempts to measure a decomposition
d = {P1, . . . , Pn} and actually measures a decomposition d′ = {P ′1, . . . , P ′n},
provided |Pi − P ′i | < ǫ for all i. Suppose now we design a quantum experiment
which would, if quantum theory were precisely correct, measure the projective
decomposition d. (Of course, the experimenter can only identify d to within
the limits of experimental precision, but, on the hypothesis that all measure-
ments are fundamentally projective, we suppose that in reality the value of d is
an objective fact.) We could imagine that the hidden variable theory uses the
following algorithm: first, it identifies the first decomposition di = {P i1, . . . , P in}
in the sequence such that |Pj − P ij | < ǫ for all j from 1 to n. Then, it reports
the outcome of the experiment as that defined by the hidden variables for di: in
other words, it reports outcome j if the hidden variable theory ascribes value 1
to P ij (and hence 0 to the other projectors in d).
It may be helpful to visualise this sort of model applied to projectors in
three real dimensions. The system to be measured can be pictured as a sphere
with (infinitesimally thin) spines of some fixed length sticking out along all the
vectors corresponding to projectors in D, coloured with 1 or 0 at their endpoint.
A quantum measurement defines an orthogonal triple of vectors, which in general
is not aligned with an orthogonal triple of spines. Applying the measurement
causes the sphere to rotate slightly, so that a nearby orthogonal triple of spines
becomes aligned with the measurement vectors. The measurement outcome is
then defined by the spine colourings.
Some points are worth emphasising here. First, the algorithm we have just
described obviously cannot be obtained from standard quantum theory. It is
the hidden variable theory that decides which projective decomposition is ac-
tually measured. Some critics have implicitly (or explicitly) assumed that the
measured decomposition must be precisely identified by standard quantum the-
oretic calculations.6 But finite precision hidden variable models need not be
6See, for example, Peres (2003), where the “challenge” seems to be based on a misunder-
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so constrained: all they need to do is simulate quantum theory to within finite
precision.
Second, as the algorithm above suggests, any given CK model actually con-
tains an infinite collection of sub-models defined by finite subsets {d1, d2, . . . , dr}
ofD with the property that they are able to reproduce quantum theory to within
some finite precision ǫr, where ǫr → 0 as r → ∞. At any given point in time,
there is a lower bound on the precision actually attainable in any feasible ex-
periment. Hence, at any given point in time, one (in fact infinitely many) of
the finite sub-models suffices to reproduce quantum theory to within attainable
experimental precision. In other words, at any given point in time, MKC’s ar-
gument can be run without using infinite dense subsets of the sets of projectors
and projective decompositions.
Third, we recall that the models CK originally defined are not complete hid-
den variable models, since no dynamics was defined for the hidden variables. As
CK noted, the models can be extended to cover sequential measurements sim-
ply by assuming that the hidden variables undergo a discontinuous change after
a measurement, so that the probability distribution of the post-measurement
hidden variables corresponds to that defined by the post-measurement quan-
tum mechanical state vectors. A complete dynamical non-contextual hidden
variable theory needs to describe successive measurements in which the inter-
vening evolution of the quantum state is non-trivial. In fact (though CK did
not note it), this could easily be done, by working in the Heisenberg rather
than the Schro¨dinger picture, and applying the CK rules to measurements of
Heisenberg operators. In this version of the CK model, the hidden variables de-
fine outcomes for measurements, change discontinuously so as to reproduce the
probability distributions for the transformed quantum state, and then remain
constant until the next measurement.
2.2 Positive operator valued measurements
Dealing with projective measurements is arguably not enough. One quite popu-
lar view of quantum theory holds that a correct version of the measurement rules
would take POV measurements as fundamental, with projective measurements
either as special cases or as idealisations which are never precisely realised in
practice. In order to define an NCHV theory catering for this line of thought,
Kent constructed a KS-colourable dense set of positive operators in a complex
Hilbert space of arbitrary dimension, with the feature that it gives rise to a
dense set of POV decompositions of the identity (Kent, 1999). Clifton and
Kent constructed a dense set of positive operators in complex Hilbert space of
arbitrary dimension with the special feature that no positive operator in the set
belongs to more than one decomposition of the identity (Clifton & Kent, 2000).
Again, the resulting set of POV decompositions is dense, and the special feature
ensures that one can average over hidden states to recover quantum predictions.
standing of this point and on neglect of the POV models defined in the next section, and also
Appleby (2001).
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Each of the three points made at the end of the last section applies equally well
to the POV models.
We should stress that the projective and POV hidden variable models de-
fined in Kent (1999) and Clifton & Kent (2000) are separate theories. One can
consider whichever model one prefers, depending whether one is most inter-
ested in simulating projective or POV quantum measurements, but they are
not meant to be combined. The POV hidden variable model does, as of course
it must, define outcomes for projective measurements considered as particular
cases of POV measurements — but not in the same way that the projective
hidden variable model does.
The CK models for POV measurements have, surprisingly, been neglected
by some critics (e.g., Peres, 2003), who object to the CK projective models on
the grounds that they unrealistically describe outcomes of ideal but imprecisely
specified projective measurements. As we noted above, this objection is indeed
reasonable if one takes the view that one should define the measured quantum
system in advance, independent of the details of the measurement apparatus,
or if one regards POV measurements as fundamental for any other reason. The
POV measurement models were devised precisely to cover these points.
3 Some criticisms of the MKC models
3.1 Are the CK models classical?
Clifton and Kent claimed that the CK models show “there is no truly compelling
argument establishing that non-relativistic quantum mechanics describes clas-
sically inexplicable physics” (Clifton & Kent, 2000, p.2113). Some (Appleby,
2000, 2001, 2003; Havlicek et al., 2001) have queried whether the models can,
in fact, properly be described as classical, given that they define values on dense
subsets of the set of measurements in such a way that every neighbourhood con-
tains operators with both truth values. This feature implies that the models
do not satisfy what we call the faithful measurement condition: that one can in
general ascribe a value to an operator P , such that this value, or one close to
it, is obtained with high probability when a high precision measurement of P is
performed.
Appleby (see Appleby, 2000, 2001, 2003) has discussed the faithful mea-
surement condition at some length, arguing that it is a necessary property of
measurements in classical models. Appleby notes that a classical measurement
tells us some definite fact about the system as it was before measurement, and
goes on to argue that the dense — in Appleby’s words, “radical” or “patholog-
ical” (Appleby, 2001, 2003) — discontinuities of truth values in the CK models
mean that they cannot satisfy this epistemological criterion: let us call it the
definite revelation criterion.
Before considering Appleby’s argument, one might first ask whether dense
discontinuities are actually necessarily a feature of any CK-type model that
simulates quantum mechanics. As Appleby (Appleby, 2001, 2003) and Ca-
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bello (Cabello, 2002) show, they are.7 Appleby’s argument thus cannot be
sidestepped.
However, in our opinion, while the CK models clearly do not satisfy the
faithful measurement criterion, they do satisfy the definite revelation criterion,
in the same sense that standard models in classical mechanics do. The CK
models can thus indeed properly be described as classical.
We believe this claim is ultimately justified by virtue of the phase space
structure and the logical structure of the CK models, both of which are classical.
However, since discussion has focussed on the discontinuity of the CK models,
it is worth considering this point in more detail.
Note, first, that discontinuity per se is clearly not an obstacle to classicality,
according to standard definitions. Point particles and finite extended objects
with boundary discontinuities are routinely studied in classical physics. More-
over, if the mere existence of discontinuities in the truth values assigned to
operators were the crucial issue, the KS theorem would be redundant — it is
immediately obvious that any truth values assigned by hidden variables must
be discontinuous, since the only possible truth values are 0 and 1, and both
must be realised. Any argument against the classicality of the CK models must,
then, stem from the fact that their discontinuities are dense.
One possible argument against the classicality of models with dense disconti-
nuities might be that, if the faithful measurement condition is not satisfied, then
little sense can be given to the notion of one finite precision measurement being
more “precise” than another. If one is not able to compare degrees of precision,
it might be argued, one has not recovered the classical concept of measurement
at all. In reply, we note that there is in fact a clear definition of the precision
of measurement devices within CK models. For example, if a high precision
device is supposed to measure z-spin, then it will with high probability return
a value of +1 whenever a measurement is performed on a particle prepared (by
another high precision device) in the corresponding eigenstate. The precision of
the relevant devices is then calibrated by the difference between the actual out-
come probability and 1, which would represent perfect precision. This feature
of CK models seems to have been neglected: for instance, it is simply not true
that, as Appleby suggests (Appleby, 2001, p.6), in CK models, the outcome of
a measurement of an observable P “does not reveal any more information . . .
[about the pre-existing value of P ] . . . than could be obtained by tossing a coin”.
If an unknown quantum state drawn from a known ensemble is measured, then
obtaining a valuation for the actually measured observable P ′ generally does
give some statistical information about the pre-measurement valuation of the
target observable P , whenever P is one of the observables to which the model
7In Cabello (2002), it is ostensibly argued that any model of the type constructed by CK
must lead to experimental predictions that differ from those of quantum mechanics. This
is clearly not correct. However, an examination of Cabello’s argument reveals a technical
assumption that is not true of the CK models, as noticed by Clifton in a private communi-
cation to Cabello, reported by Cabello in a footnote. Cabello’s reply to Clifton is essentially
an attempt to justify the assumption by appeal to something like the faithful measurement
condition. Thus his argument is best viewed as a demonstration that CK-type models cannot
have this feature. Appleby (2001) offers a similar analysis of Cabello’s argument.
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assigns a valuation.
Another possible argument might begin from the observation that systems
that are actually studied in the context of classical mechanics generally sat-
isfy the faithful measurement condition, which might suggest that the condition
is implied by some part of classical intuition. But induction based merely on
familiarity is a dangerous exercise. (Three-legged dogs are still canine, for ex-
ample.) It is, admittedly, rare to consider classical systems which have dense
discontinuities, but it does not contradict any standard definition of classicality
of which we are aware. Given consistent evolution laws, one can sensibly study
the behaviour of a classical system in which point particles are initially sited at
every rational vector in R3, for instance.
To address Appleby’s point directly, we note that according to the CK mod-
els a measurement does, in fact, reveal the pre-existing valuation of an observ-
able. Consider again a CK model defined by the algorithm given in section
2.1. It is true that finite experimental precision makes it impossible for a hu-
man experimenter to identify precisely either the quantum observable which any
given experiment would end up measuring if quantum theory is correct, or the
CK observable which it would end up measuring if a CK model were correct.
Nonetheless there is, according to the CK models, a fact of the matter about
the identity of both observables. The process runs thus: some definite quan-
tum observable is defined by the experimental configuration; some definite CK
observable, related to the quantum observable by some definite algorithm, is
thus also indirectly defined by the experimental configuration; the pre-existing
valuation of this CK observable is revealed by the experiment. An omniscient
deity viewing the whole process “from the outside” could verify the action of
the CK model, following (for example) the algorithm discussed in Section 2.1,
and predict in advance precisely which CK observable will be addressed and the
valuation that will be revealed. In other words, the CK models do satisfy the
definite revelation criterion, as we understand it.
Finally, but importantly, we can offer an alternative response to those unper-
suaded by any of the above arguments. As we noted earlier, one can define CK
models that simulate quantum mechanics adequately (given any specific attain-
able experimental precision) using finite collections of projections and projective
decompositions. These models are still discontinuous, but they have only finitely
many discontinuities, rather than a dense set. They therefore satisfy the faithful
measurement condition (this being possible because any particular such model
will make different predictions from quantum mechanics once a certain precision
is exceeded). As above, one can visualise such a model, in R3, as defined by
a sphere with finitely many spines projecting from it. In terms of its disconti-
nuities (which are finite in number) and its dynamics (which could be precisely
defined by a sufficiently complex force law) such an object is analogous to a
finite set of point particles. There is no sensible definition of classicality that
renders it (or analogues with more degrees of freedom) non-classical.
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3.2 Are the CK models consistent with quantum proba-
bilities?
In Appleby (2000), it is argued that any model of a certain type must either be
contextual or violate the predictions of quantum mechanics. In Breuer (2002),
it is argued that NCHV models of yet a different type make different predictions
from quantum mechanics. Appleby and Breuer both make assumptions that are
not true of the CK constructions.
In Appleby (2000), it is argued that any non-contextual model of a certain
kind makes different predictions from quantum theory. Appleby assumes that in
an imprecise measurement of observables corresponding to three projectors, the
three projectors actually measured are not exactly commuting, but are picked
out via independent probability distributions. However, this is not how CK
models work. For example, in a CK model for projective measurements, the
projectors actually measured are always commuting (assuming that they are
measured simultaneously) - this is one of the axioms of the theory that relate
its mathematical structure to the world, i.e., it is not some kind of miraculous
coincidence. If the projectors are measured sequentially, then the rules of the
model stipulate that the hidden state changes discontinuously after each mea-
surement and Appleby’s analysis no longer applies. Similar remarks apply to
the POV version.
In Breuer (2002) it is shown that any finite precision NCHV model that
assigns values to a dense subset of projection operators, and also satisfies a
certain extra assumption, must make different predictions from quantum me-
chanics. Suppose that a spin measurement is performed on a spin-1 particle
and that the measurement direction desired by the experimenter (the target
direction) is ~n. The assumption is that the actual measurement direction is in
a random direction ~m, and that the distribution ω~n,ǫ(~m) over possible actual
directions, given ~n and the experimental precision ǫ, satisfies
ωR~n,ǫ(R~m) = ω~n,ǫ(~m),
for all rotations R. Of course, the CK models do not satisfy this condition, and
Breuer notes this. In fact, it is clear that no model that colours only a countable
set of vectors could satisfy the condition. To those who regard Breuer’s condition
as desirable on aesthetic grounds, we need offer no counter-argument: it was
conceded from the beginning that the CK models are unaesthetic.
3.3 Non-locality and quantum logic
Any hidden variable theory that reproduces the predictions of quantum me-
chanics must be non-local, by Bell’s theorem. The CK models are no exception.
Some have argued (Appleby, 2002; Boyle & Schafir, 2001), however, that non-
locality is itself a kind of contextuality, and that any theory that is non-local
must also, therefore, be contextual. Indeed, it is relatively common to read in
the literature the claim that non-locality is a special case of contextuality. Here,
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we simply wish to point out that non-locality and contextuality are logically in-
dependent concepts. Newtonian gravity provides an example of a theory that
is non-contextual and non-local. One can also imagine theories that are contex-
tual and local - for example, a sort of modified quantum mechanics, in which
wave function collapse propagates at the speed of light (Kent, 2002). Appleby
notes the example of Newtonian gravity himself, but states that “in the frame-
work of quantum mechanics the phenomena of contextuality and non-locality
are closely connected” (Appleby, 2002, p.1). This is true, but it is not nec-
essarily the case that what is true in the framework of quantum mechanics is
still true when we take the point of view of the hidden variables — and when
assessing hidden variable models, it is the hidden variables’ point of view that is
important. Appleby (2002) concludes, based on a GHZ-type example, that the
CK models display “existential contextuality”. It seems to us that, considered
from the proper hidden variable model theoretic rather than quantum theoretic
perspective, Appleby’s argument simply demonstrates the non-locality of the
CK models — which were, of course, explicitly presented as non-relativistic and
necessarily non-local.
Finally, some have objected to the MKCmodels on the grounds that elements
of the quantum formalism, for example the superposition principle (Cabello,
1999) or the quantum logical relations between projectors (Havlicek et al., 2001;
Busch, 2003), are not preserved. We note that this is of no importance from the
point of view of the hidden variables. The whole point is that they have their
own classical logical structure.
4 Experimental tests of contextuality?
Another issue that has arisen, both prior to and during the course of these de-
bates, is that of an experimental test of contextuality. Some experiments have
actually been performed. An examination of this issue, in particular of what
the experiments can really tell us, is of interest independently from the MKC
models and will improve our understanding of the Kochen-Specker theorem.
But the issue is also relevant for MKC models. Indeed if it were possible to rule
out non-contextual theories via a decisive experimental test, this would seem to
contradict the claim that the CK models reproduce the predictions of quantum
mechanics to arbitrary precision and are non-contextual. In Sec. 4.1 we argue
that, quite independently of the issue of finite precision, the idea of an exper-
imental refutation of non-contextuality is based on conceptual confusion, and
that the experiments that have actually been carried out are, as far as contex-
tuality goes, not of major significance. We examine in particular an experiment
that has actually been performed, Huang et al. (2003), inspired by a proposal
of Simon et al. (2000), in turn based on a scheme of Cabello & Garc´ia-Alcaine
(1998). (Another recent experiment is that of Hasegawa et al. (2003), which is
similar to a proposal of Basu et al. (2001) - we do not discuss this in detail,
since the same arguments apply). In Sec. 4.2, we argue that in addition, the
MKC finite precision loophole does apply, in the sense that any experiment can
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be simulated by the CK models. Finally, in Sec. 4.3 we discuss the operational
approach of Simon et al. (2001) and Larsson (2002).
4.1 What can an experiment tell us about contextuality?
We begin by discussing the possibility of an experimental test of contextuality
in the absence of finite precision considerations. It is easiest to do this with a
particular example in mind, so we make particular reference to the scheme which
Simon et al. (SZWZ) proposed and which inspired the experiments reported by
Huang et al. (HLZPG). Consider a 4-dimensional Hilbert space, which we can
think of as representing two 2-dimensional subsystems. The two subsystems are
associated with the path and polarisation degrees of freedom of a single photon.
Define the subsystem observables Z1, X1, Z2, X2, where subscript 1 indicates
the path degree of freedom and subscript 2 the polarisation degree of freedom.
Suppose that Zˆi = σzi and Xˆi = σxi, where σzi and σxi are Pauli operators
acting on subsystem i. Each of these observables can take the values +1,−1.
In an NCHV interpretation, a hidden state must assign a value to each of these
observables that would simply be revealed on measurement. This in turn defines
a colouring of the corresponding set of operators, V (Zˆ1), V (Xˆ1), V (Zˆ2), V (Xˆ2).
One can also consider observables that are products of these observables, for
example, Z1X2. Product observables also take the values +1,−1, and from the
KS criteria we have:
V (Zˆ1Zˆ2) = V (Zˆ1)V (Zˆ2)
V (Zˆ1Xˆ2) = V (Zˆ1)V (Xˆ2)
V (Xˆ1Zˆ2) = V (Xˆ1)V (Zˆ2)
V (Xˆ1Xˆ2) = V (Xˆ1)V (Xˆ2) . (2)
Finally, the contradiction arises on consideration of the quantum state
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|+ z〉|+ z〉+ | − z〉| − z〉)
=
1√
2
(|+ x〉|+ x〉 + | − x〉| − x〉),
where |+ z〉 is an eigenstate of Zˆi with eigenvalue +1, and so on. This state has
the property that measurement of the product Z1Z2 always returns 1, as does
measurement of X1X2. If V (Zˆ1) = V (Zˆ2), V (Xˆ1) = V (Xˆ2), and Eqs. (2) are
satisfied, then it follows logically that V (Zˆ1Xˆ2) = V (Xˆ1Zˆ2). Yet in quantum
mechanics, one can measure Z1X2 and X1Z2 simultaneously, and if the state
is |φ+〉, then one will get opposite results with certainty. Hence we have a
contradiction.8
8This argument differs from standard Kochen-Specker-style proofs (and from Cabello and
Garc´ia-Alcaine’s argument) in that the predictions from a particular quantum state are used
to obtain a contradiction.
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In principle, a laboratory implementation could use a network of beam split-
ters, polarising beam splitters and half-wave plates in order to prepare a single
photon in the state |φ+〉 and perform each of the joint measurements
(Z1, Z2), (Z1, X2), (X1, Z2), (X1, X2), (Z1X2, X1Z2) .
In the experiment of HLZPG, only the (X1, X2) and (Z1X2, X1Z2) mea-
surements were actually performed, with the outcome of a potential (Z1, Z2)
measurement being assumed from the method of state preparation. Though a
detailed critique of HLZPG’s experiment is beyond our scope here, we should
note that it deviates in various ways from the ideal version proposed by SZWZ,
and add that we find their discussion hard to follow at various points: for exam-
ple, they appear to interpret one of their settings (their setup 2) as performing
a simultaneous measurement of X1, Z2 and Z1X2.
What, in any case, could an experiment along the lines suggested by SZWZ
show? In each of Cabello & Garc´ia-Alcaine (1998), Simon et al. (2000), and
Huang et al. (2003), the work is motivated via an analogy with Bell’s theorem.
Bell’s theorem tells us that locally causal theories are incompatible with quan-
tum mechanics, according to Bell’s precise definition (Bell, 1985) of “locally
causal”. The associated experimental tests have strongly confirmed quantum
mechanics. Then it is claimed, for example, that
“The Kochen-Specker theorem states that non-contextual theo-
ries are incompatible with quantum mechanics.” (Simon et al., 2000,
p.1783)
If one takes this at face value, it seems easy to accept that a Kochen-Specker ex-
periment to test non-contextuality would be of similar interest and fundamental
importance to a Bell experiment that tests local causality.
However, there is a key point, not noted by these authors, where the analogy
breaks down. A Bell experiment allows us to test the predictions of quantum
mechanics against those of locally causal theories because a definition of all the
terms used in a derivation of Bell’s theorem (in particular the term “locally
causal” itself) can be given that is theory-independent. Yet in the Kochen-
Specker scheme above, the observables have not been defined in a manner that is
theory-independent, but have instead been defined with respect to the quantum
mechanical operators. When a simultaneous measurement of Z1X2 and X1Z2 is
performed, the experimental setup as a whole looks different from that employed
in a simultaneous measurement of, say, X1 and X2.
For example, HLZPG describe two experimental setups: to get from one
to the other one needs to rotate the two half-wave plates they call HWP1 and
HWP2. What gives us licence to claim that one of these setups really measures
two observables, of which one is the product of Z1 and X2 and the other is
the product of X1 and Z2? The answer is: our conventional physical under-
standing of the experiment, as informed by the quantum formalism. HLZPG
need to assume that the effects of devices such as beam splitters and half-wave
plates are well described by the Hilbert space formalism. That they do this im-
plicitly is evident in remarks such as “the interference on a BS [beam splitter]
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performs a Hadamard transformation of the path qubit” (Huang et al., 2003,
p.2). But there is no reason to assume that such statements will be true (or even
meaningful) in a theory that is not quantum mechanics. Thus there is no theory-
independent means of knowing that we really are doing a simultaneous measure-
ment of the product of Z1 and X2, and the product of X1 and Z2. But this
is crucial if we are to conclude unequivocally that contextuality is being exhib-
ited. Similar comments apply to Hasegawa et al.’s experiment(Hasegawa et al.,
2003): their spin rotator and phase shifter need to be adjusted to alter their
parameters α and χ, and they naturally need to rely on the standard quantum
formalism in order to interpret the experiment as carrying out measurements of
particular projections onto the path and spin degrees of freedom.
Of course, the mathematical arguments given by these various authors are
valid, and offer yet further proofs that there are no NCHV interpretations of
the quantum mechanical formalism. And clearly the experiments confirm some
predictions of quantum theory. However, Cabello and Garc´ia-Alcaine’s claim
that this type of experiment can show that
“NCHV theories, without any call to the formal structure of QM,
make conflicting predictions with those of QM” (Cabello & Garc´ia-Alcaine,
1998, p.1797, their emphasis),
which is echoed by HLZPG, is simply not correct.
These remarks apply quite generally to any proposed test of contextuality
that involves measuring product observables. Without using locality arguments,
there is no way to guarantee that a given measurement is of an observable that is
precisely in product form, nor that two different measurements involve products
of the same operator. If such an experiment is performed, and results consistent
with quantum mechanics obtained, what can we conclude? We have essentially
three choices. First, accept the basic quantum formalism and accept also that
any underlying hidden variable theory assigning values to Hermitian operators
must be contextual. Second, look for loopholes in our interpretation of the
experimental results. Or third, reject the Hilbert space structure and look for
an entirely different theory of the experiment that is non-contextual in its own
terms.
The second move is exploited by the MKC models. The third move will
always be logically possible if non-contextuality is defined (as it often is in the
literature) as simply requiring that the value obtained on measuring a given
observable does not depend on which other observables are measured at the
same time. No mention of Hermitian operators is given in this definition, so it
has the appearance of being theory independent. But it is not all that useful.
It allows a non-contextual theory of any experiment to be cooked up in a trivial
manner, simply by redefining what counts as an observable — for instance,
by taking an observable to correspond to the full projective decomposition of
the identity defining any given measurement, rather than to a single projection
(van Fraassen, 1973).
Note that if a Bell experiment is performed, and the quantum predictions
verified, then we have analogues of the first two options above: we can reject
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local causality, or we can look for loopholes in the experiment. Both options have
been much explored. But the analogy breaks down when we consider the third
option above, because the Hilbert space structure was not used either in the
derivation of Bell’s theorem or in the interpretation of the experiment.9 It also
breaks down when we consider the outcomes of exploring the second option:
finite experimental precision poses no fundamental difficulty in the analysis
of Bell experiments, but turns out to be an unstoppable loophole in Kochen-
Specker experiments.
Granted then, that this type of experiment cannot be of decisive significance,
can it have any significance? Can it be interpreted as a test between quantum
mechanics and a different kind of theory? If it can, then it must be as a test
between quantum mechanics and non-contextual theories of a rather restricted
kind. Such an experiment, for example, could serve as a test between quan-
tum mechanics and a non-contextual theory that accepts some part of Hilbert
space structure (including the operators for path and polarisation degrees of
freedom,and the action of devices such as beam splitters), but rejects the KS
criteria. Logically, this would be a valid experiment. However, in order to mo-
tivate it, one would need to devise an interesting and plausible alternative to
quantum theory which retains the features just mentioned but violates (1). Con-
sidering such alternatives is beyond our scope here; we only wish to note that
the class of such alternatives is not nearly as general and natural as the class
of locally causal theories. So far as the project of verifying the contextuality
of Nature (as opposed to the contextuality of hidden variable interpretations of
the standard quantum formalism) is concerned, the question is of rather limited
relevance and interest.
In conclusion, experiments along the lines of those of Cabello & Garc´ia-Alcaine
(1998), Simon et al. (2000) and Huang et al. (2003), do not and cannot deci-
sively distinguish between contextuality and non-contextuality in Nature. If the
quantum formalism of states and operators (and the assignments of states and
operators to particular experimental devices) is not assumed, then the exper-
iments tell us little. On the other hand, if the standard quantum formalism
is assumed, then we know already from the Kochen-Specker theorem, before
we carry out any experiments, that there is no way of assigning values non-
contextually to the set of all Hermitian operators. Mermin’s comment that
“the whole notion of an experimental test of [the Kochen-Specker
theorem] misses the point” (Mermin, quoted in Cabello & Garc´ia-Alcaine,
1998)
still seems to us to apply.
9Of course, even local causality cannot be defined with no assumptions about an underlying
theory. It requires the notion of a background space-time with a causal structure. Bell’s
discussion of the implications of local causality for Bell experiments also implicitly requires
that the notion of an experimental outcome has its conventional meaning.
It is worth noting, incidentally, that this last point leaves room for arguing that an Ev-
erettian interpretation of quantum theory might be defined so as to be locally causal. We will
not pursue this here, since the larger questions of whether a coherent Everettian interpretation
exists, and if so on what assumptions, are beyond our present scope.
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4.2 Experiments and finite precision
In addition to the considerations of the last section, it is of course the case that
a CK model can simulate any quantum experiment, and this includes so-called
tests of the Kochen-Specker theorem. We shall leave it to the reader to examine
in detail how a CK model will work when applied to any specific experimental
setup. Obviously the fact that beam splitters, half wave plates and so on,
will be constantly shifting in alignment by minute amounts will lead to finite
precision in the case of the HLZPG experiment. This means that each time a
photon passes through the apparatus, the actual observables measured will be
slightly different. The CK models then show us that even if it is assumed that
the operation of each experimental device is well described by the Hilbert space
formalism, a non-contextual, classical simulation of the experiment is possible.10
We make a brief remark about the experiment of Hasegawa et al. (2003),
and the proposal of Basu et al. (2001). In both cases, an inequality is derived,
formally identical to the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality (Clauser et al.,
1969), that concerns the spin and path degrees of freedom of a single neutron.
It may seem as if this evades the finite precision loophole, since the inequality
is violated by an irreducibly finite amount. The derivation of the inequality,
however, assumes that all measurements performed are strictly of the form A⊗I,
in the case of a path degree of freedom, or I ⊗ B, in the case of a spin degree
of freedom. A CK model, on the other hand, assumes that the actual operators
measured are not in fact precisely separable, even in experiments which are
designed to measure separate commuting observables. When arguments based
on locality and space-like separation are forbidden — as they are here, since
the question is whether quantum contextuality can be demonstrated separately
from quantum non-locality — this is not physically implausible. Beam splitters
generally have a slight polarising effect, for example. More generally, adjusting
any piece of the experimental apparatus slightly influences all the others.
4.3 Defining observables operationally
One may try to avoid the above arguments by framing a definition of contextual-
ity that is genuinely independent of Hilbert space structure. This could be done
by giving a completely operational definition of “observable” and hence of “con-
textuality”. This may seem to have the additional advantage of avoiding the
issue of finite precision, since operational definitions do not assume infinite pre-
cision in the first place. The operational approach is hinted at in Mermin (1999)
and worked out explicitly by Simon, Bruckner and Zeilinger (SBZ) and Larsson
(Simon et al., 2001; Larsson, 2002). The work of both SBZ and Larsson is moti-
vated by the issue of finite precision and is presented as a riposte to MKC. SBZ,
10At the end of their paper, HLZPGmake passing reference to the problem of finite precision,
mentioning the work of Simon et al. (2001) and Cabello (2002). The former we discuss below,
here noting only that it is not relevant to HLZPG’s experiment, since they do not actually
apply the result, nor can it be applied to their data. The latter we have already mentioned
in Sec. 3.1, noting that the faithful measurement condition must be assumed, and that this is
not necessary for classicality.
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for example, describe their work as showing “how to derive hidden-variable the-
orems that apply to real experiments, so that non-contextual hidden variables
can indeed be experimentally disproved.” This seems to contradict directly the
claims of CK, in particular, who say that the CK models are non-contextual
and reproduce correctly the quantum predictions for any finite precision experi-
ment. We shall see, however, that there is really no tension here. The apparent
contradiction rests on different uses of the word “contextual”. Further, we shall
argue that the work of SBZ and Larsson, while interesting, does not have the
significance they claim. For definiteness, we discuss the work of SBZ, although
Larsson’s is very similar.
SBZ consider a black box with three knobs, each of which has a finite num-
ber of different settings. After setting the knobs, an observer presses a “go”
button. He then receives an outcome for each knob, which is either a 1 or a
0. As an example of such a box, we can consider one that contains within it a
quantum experiment in which the spin squared of a spin-1 particle is measured
in three different directions. The directions are determined to some degree of
accuracy by the settings of the knobs. However, it will not be the case that a
given knob setting corresponds to a measurement of spin squared in precisely
the same direction every time the box is used. There will be experimental in-
accuracies. In general, we may imagine that there are some hidden variables
associated with the measuring apparatus, as well as the quantum system, which
determine exactly what measurement is being performed. From the point of
view of our observer outside the black box, however, none of this matters. All
he has access to are the three knobs and the outcomes. SBZ propose that the
observer should simply, by fiat, define observables operationally, with each ob-
servable corresponding to a different setting of one of the knobs. He can always
be sure which observable he is measuring, according to this operational defini-
tion, even though he cannot be sure which observable is actually being measured
according to quantum theory.
Not knowing what is happening inside the box, our outside observer can
try to formulate a model theory. In a deterministic model theory, the entire
inside of the box can be described by some hidden state that predicts what the
three outcomes will be for each possible joint setting of the knobs. The model
is non-contextual if, for each hidden state, the outcome obtained for each knob
depends only on its setting, and not on the settings of the other two knobs. On
running the box repeatedly, the observer can build up outcome statistics for
each possible joint knob setting. If no non-contextual model of the workings
of the box that reproduces these statistics exists, for any deterministic model
theory, then, SBZ propose, we should say that the box is “contextual”.
Let us consider the implications of this definition applied to projective mea-
surements on a 3-dimensional space. Take a set of 3-dimensional vectors that is
KS-uncolourable, in the sense that it is impossible to give each vector a 0 or a 1
such that each orthogonal triad consists of one 1 and two 0s. The set of vectors
can be written, for example
{{~n1, ~n2, ~n3}, {~n1, ~n4, ~n5}, . . .}.
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For the set to be KS-uncolourable, it must be the case that some vectors appear
in more than one triad. Suppose that these triads are taken to indicate possible
triads of knob settings. Suppose that the experiment is run many times, and it
is found that whenever one of these triads is measured, the outcomes consist of
one 1 and two 0s. Then we can conclude, from the fact that the set of vectors
is KS-uncolourable, that the box is “contextual” according to SBZ’s definition
— a property we refer to hereafter as SBZ-contextual.
This, though, is too much of an idealisation. In a real experiment there
will be noise, which will sometimes cause non-standard results, for example
two 1s and a 0. The core of SBZ’s paper is a proof of the following result.
Imagine that the box is run many times, with knob settings corresponding to
orthogonal triads, and that the outcomes are one 1 and two 0s in a fraction
1 − ǫ of cases. Then, the box must be SBZ-contextual if ǫ < 1/N , where N is
the number of orthogonal triads appearing in the set. If the box is in fact a
quantum experiment in which the spin squared of a spin-1 particle is measured
in different directions, then increasing the accuracy of the experiment will be
able to reduce ǫ below 1/N . The observer will be able to conclude that the
experiment is SBZ-contextual.
We wish to make several related remarks concerning this result. The first
thing is to clarify the implication for MKC models. A box with a quantum spin
experiment inside is certainly simulable by a CK model, since the models are
explicitly constructed to reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics
for finite precision measurements. How will the simulation work? On each run,
the knob settings determine approximately which measurement is performed,
but exactly which is determined randomly, or by apparatus hidden variables.
The exact measurement corresponds to some Hermitian operator in the CK
KS-colourable set. The outcome is determined by a hidden state that assigns
a definite value to each operator in the KS-colourable set in a non-contextual
manner. Hence if observables are defined by operators, it is true that the value
obtained on measuring a given observable does not depend on which other ob-
servables are measured at the same time and in this sense, the CK model is
non-contextual. The fact that the black box is SBZ-contextual tells us that
the settings of all three knobs together, along with the apparatus hidden state,
are needed to determine the Hermitian operators that are in fact being mea-
sured. In a way, of course, it couldn’t be any different, since one cannot expect
an algorithm that chooses three vectors independently generally to produce an
orthogonal triad. The SBZ-contextuality of the black box tells us in addition
that for at least some apparatus hidden states, whether the measurement cor-
responds to a triad for which knob i gets outcome 0 or a triad for which knob i
gets outcome 1 depends on the settings of knobs j and k.
This should be enough to show that there is no formal contradiction between
the CK and the SBZ results. Some may argue, however, that from a physical
point of view, the operational definition of SBZ-contextuality is the only inter-
esting one, and that the CK models, therefore, are not non-contextual in any
interesting sense — or at least that the operational definition is an interest-
ing one, and the CK models are not non-contextual in this sense. We wish to
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counter such arguments with some cautionary remarks concerning these black
boxes.
First, SBZ, as did the authors of the experiments discussed in Sec. 4 above,
motivate their work via an analogy with Bell’s theorem. The disanalogy we men-
tioned in Sec. 4 has disappeared now that observables are defined operationally.
However, there is another important disanalogy. This is that there is nothing
specifically non-classical about a black box that is behaving SBZ-contextually.
One could easily construct such a box out of cog-wheels and springs. Thus with
no knowledge of or assumptions about the internal workings of the box, one
could not use it to distinguish classical from quantum behaviour.
This should be contrasted rigorously with the case of a black box which be-
haves non-locally in the sense of producing Bell correlations. (Of course, to de-
fine this sense of non-locality, we assume that special relativity is approximately
correct and an approximately Minkowski causal structure is given.) Then, if we
have a black box, large enough to allow space-like separated outputs to be iden-
tified, which behaves non-locally, we know that we are in a quantum, and not a
classical, universe. Such a box can even be used for information theoretic tasks
that cannot be accomplished classically (e.g., Buhrman et al., 2001). Given a
black box that is SBZ-contextual, we have no such guarantees. This seems to
us to cast doubt on the use or significance of a purely operational definition of
contextuality, as opposed to a theory-relative one.
Second, the fact of the matter is that any realistic experiment, whether
carried out in a classical or a quantum universe, will necessarily exhibit SBZ-
contextuality to some (possibly tiny) degree. Not only that, the outcome proba-
bilities for any given SBZ-observable will depend (at least slightly) on the context
of the other knob settings. On moving one knob, for example, its gravitational
field will be changed, and this will affect the behaviour of the whole apparatus.
This is not a consequence of quantum theory. It would be true of an experiment
in which a classical measuring apparatus measures classical observables on a
classical system. Yet we would not infer from this SBZ-contextuality of the out-
comes that classical physics is (at least slightly) contextual. We do not take SBZ
and Larsson to be advocating otherwise: all sides in the Kochen-Specker debate
agree that classical physics is, paradigmatically, non-contextual. Rather, we
take the fact that the opposite conclusion follows from SBZ’s and Larsson’s def-
initions to indicate that the definition of SBZ-contextuality is inherently flawed.
Similarly, we take the fact that SBZ’s definition of an observable can in principle
empirically be shown to be context-dependent — since the outcome probabil-
ities depend at least slightly on knob settings that are meant to correspond
to independent observables — to be a fatal flaw in that definition. An SBZ-
observable turns out, under scrutiny, to be a rather complicated construct, with
quite different properties from its quantum namesake. A less freighted name
— “dial setting”, for instance — would make clearer the obstacles which SBZ
would need to surmount in order even to begin a properly founded discussion
of finite precision experimental tests of contextuality.
This last point really needs no reinforcement, but it can be reinforced. Con-
sider again the black box that in fact contains a quantum experiment in which
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the spin squared of a spin-1 particle is measured in different directions. The
idea was to run the box repeatedly with certain combinations of knob settings
that correspond to the orthogonal triads in a KS-uncolourable set of vectors.
However, assuming that they can be moved independently, there is nothing to
stop us from setting the knobs in any combination of settings, in particular,
in combinations that correspond to triads of non-orthogonal vectors from the
KS-uncolourable set. What would happen in this case? The quantum exper-
iment inside the box cannot be effecting a simultaneous measurement of the
spin squared in three directions approximating the knob settings, because these
spin squared observables will not be co-measurable. Perhaps the box measures
spin squared in three orthogonal directions, at least one of which is not close to
the corresponding knob setting. Or perhaps the box does some kind of positive
operator valued measurement. In either case, it seems that for most quantum
experiments, from the observer’s point of view, the outcomes will inevitably be
contextual even at the level of the quantum probabilities, and even if we un-
realistically neglect the classical perturbations produced on the apparatus by
altering any of the knobs. Given that the box is behaving in an overtly contex-
tual manner even at the level of probabilities, one is then again led to ask: why
should we be interested in whether the box can be described in a non-contextual
fashion in the special case that we carefully restrict our knob settings so that
they always correspond to orthogonal triads in the KS-uncolourable set?
Taking these points on board, careful operationalists might try to refine
their position by speaking, not of a distinction between SBZ-contextuality and
SBZ-non-contextuality, but instead of degrees of SBZ-contextuality. It could be
argued that, although classical mechanics is indeed SBZ-contextual, the pertur-
bations that imply SBZ-contextualities in outcome probabilities will generally
be very small, and the outcome probability SBZ-contextualities correspondingly
hard to detect: indeed, in principle, with sufficient care, the perturbations can
be made as small as desired. In contrast, SBZ and Larsson’s results might be
interpreted as implying that quantum experiments display an irreducible finite
degree of SBZ-contextuality. The difficulty with this line of argument is that,
as the CK models illustrate, it is not always true in classical mechanics that
small perturbations induce (only) correspondingly subtle effects. Operational-
ists would need to frame a definition which separates classical mechanics not
only from the CK models (defined by infinite subsets of projective or positive
operator valued decompositions) but also from infinitely many of their finite sub-
models (defined, as above, by finite subsets which reproduce quantum theory
to some fixed finite precision ǫr), in order to maintain both that classical me-
chanics is at least approximately or effectively SBZ-non-contextual and that all
finite precision approximations to quantum theory defined by CK models that
are precise to within ǫ, for some ǫ > 0, are definitively SBZ-contextual. This
cannot be done: as we have already noted, in principle the finite sub-models
give a prescription for building real classical devices with finitely many degrees
of freedom, and these devices are, of course, described by classical mechanics.
In summary, even black box operational definitions do not allow unambigu-
ous experimental discrimination between contextual and non-contextual theo-
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ries, and thus present no challenge to CK’s assertion that non-contextual the-
ories can account for current physics. SBZ’s operational definition of contex-
tuality does give us a clear, theory-independent notion of something, but it is
not contextuality in any sense consistent with standard usage. In particular,
the notion defined is not able to separate the properties of quantum theory and
classical mechanics, and so is not of fundamental relevance to the debate over
finite precision and the KS theorem. Attractive though it would be to devise a
sensible theory-independent definition of (non-)contextuality, we do not believe
it is possible. We see no fundamentally satisfactory alternative to restricting
ourselves to talking of theories as being non-contextual or contextual, and us-
ing theory-relative definitions of these terms.
5 A Closing Comment
We would like to emphasise that neither the preceding discussion nor earlier
contributions to this debate (Kent (1999); Clifton & Kent (2000)) are or were
intended to cast doubt on the essential importance and interest of the Kochen-
Specker theorem. As we have stressed throughout, our interest in examining
the logical possibility of non-contextual hidden variables simulating quantum
mechanics is simply that it is a logical — if scientifically highly implausible —
possibility, which demonstrates interesting limitations on what we can rigorously
infer about fundamental physics.
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